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Abstract
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a type of vulnerability typically found in Web
applications that enables users to input data and uses user submitted data
without proper sanitation. XSS enables attackers to inject client-side script into
Web pages viewed by other users.A cross-site scripting vulnerability present in
web application may be used by attackers to bypass access controls such as the
Same Origin Policy(SOP). Cross site-scripting is ranked 3rd among list of Top
10 vulnerability mentioned in OWASP (Open Web Application Security Projects).
Some of existing solutions to XSS attack include use of regular expressions to
detect the presence of malicious dynamic content that can easily bypassed using
parsing quirks and client side filtering mechanisms such as Noscript and Noxes
tool which require security awareness by user that cannot be guaranteed.Some of
existing solutions are unacceptably slow and can be bypassed .Some of them as
too restrictive resulting in loss of functionality.
In our work,we developed server side response filtering API that will allow
benign HTML to pass through it but blocks harmful script. It does not require
large amount of modification in existing web application. Proposed system is
having high fidelity and low response time.
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Inroduction
Web 2.0 allows web application users to interact and collaborate with each other in
a social media dialog as creators of user-generated content in a virtual community,
as opposed to sites where individuals are constrained to view passive contents.
Which resulted in sudden increase in social networking sites, and web applications
which deliver dynamic content to the clients and increase in the user created
HTML content in the World Wide Web.
But largely Web developers ignored the security aspects of the websites which
resulted in continuous Cyber-attacks on them. There are lots of vulnerabilities
still present in web sites as list below and hackers are continuously finding new
attacks to exploit these vulnerabilities [4].
• Injection
• Broken Authentication and Session Management
• Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
• Insecure Direct Object References
• Security Misconfiguration
• Sensitive Data Exposure
• Missing Function Level Access Control
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• Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
• Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
• Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
We will be discussing XSS attack in detail in this work.Cross-site scripting
(XSS) is a type of web security vulnerability typically found in Web applications
that accepts user inputs.XSS enables attackers to insert client-side script into Web
pages viewed by other users.Restrictive access control mechanism like Same Origin
Policy(SOP) can be bypassed using XSS attack.Cross-site scripting is ranked 3rd
in Top 10 vulnerability list of OWASP (Open Web Application Security Projects).
Impact of XSS attack depends on the degree of sensitivity of the data
handled by the vulnerable website and the security mitigation implemented by
the administrator. This impact may be range from pretty low to significantly
high. Cross-site scripting uses known loopholes present in web-based applications,
servers or plug-in systems on which they rely. Exploitation of one of above
loopholes allows insertion of malicious content into the contents being delivered
from the compromised site. When the resulting compromised content arrives at
the user web browser, it is considered as it is delivered from the trusted source,
and thus operates under the permissions granted to that access data associated
with source website. Attacker can gain privileged access to highly sensitive data,
such as session cookies, and other information stored by browser on user behalf by
finding different ways to inject malicious script into web pages. Cross-site scripting
attacks are special case of code injection.
Cross site scripting (XSS) is type of attack deployed at application layer of
network hierarchy. XSS commonly targets scripts embedded in a page which
are executed on the client-side (in the users web browser) rather than on the
server side. XSS is a threat arises due to internet security weaknesses of various
client-side technologies such as HTML, JavaScript, VBScript, ActiveX and Flash.
Presence of weakness in these technologies is a main reason for the exploit. XSS
is triggered by manipulation of client-side scripts present in web application in a
2
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way as anticipated by attacker. Such manipulation embeds script in page which
is executed wherever that page is loaded or associated event is performed. In
a classic XSS attack the attacker infects authentic web page with his malicious
client-side script. When a user visits this web page the script is downloaded to
his browser and executed.
One of the basic example of XSS is when a hacker injects a script in a legitimate
shopping site URL. When user clicks on such link he will be redirected to a fake
but identical page. The malicious page would run a script to steal the cookie of
the user surfing the shopping site, and that cookie gets sent to the malicious user
who can now capture the legitimate users session. As no attack is performed on
the shopping site, but still XSS has misused a scripting weakness in the webpage
to trick a user and take command of his session. A trick normally used to make
malicious URLs less clear to recognize is to encode XSS part of URL in any
supported encoding method. And this will make attack URL look harmless to
user who recognizes the familiar URLs and hence they will simply neglect and end
up clicking them which results in exploit.
1.1 Types of XSS attacks
Depending on the process followed for execution of XSS attack,they can be majorly
classified in following categories.
1.1.1 Non-persistent/Reflected XSS Attack
Non-persistent attacks are types of attack in which user provided data present in
request to server is reflected partially of completely in the form of error message,
search result or any other type of response. Non-persistent attacks are delivered
to victim in various ways such as in an e-mail message or link present in other web
site. When user is deceived to click on malicious link which result in submission
of specially crafted form or just browsing of malicious site which will reflect attack




Figure 1.1: Reflected XSS attack flow
As explained above attacker will include script given as below.So when victim
will click on that link then request is sent to webapplication.com with given data
search parameter that are pointing to the script stored at attacker server that will
steal cookie.When webapplication.com sends response then that script will gets
executed at victims browser resulting in cookie stealing attack.
Figure 1.2: URL containing malicious script
In some case attacker can trick victim by encoding the URL parameters in order
hide the parameter from him/her.Below figure show content of URL mentioned in
figure 1.2 encoded in hex encoding scheme.
One of the way to achieve reflected XSS attack through websites search
box.Generally it will accept content from user and display the search results
associated with it and that content also.Fig 1.4 show example that shows search
content and reflected contents.In Fig 1.4 normal content is searched.
Now if same search box is provided with some benign HTML.After reflecting
4
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Figure 1.3: Encoded URL of fig 1.2 containing malicious script
Figure 1.4: Search with normal search query
the query data that HTML is interpreted by browser.And resulting response page
show in Fig 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Search with HTML content
Now attacker can take advantage of this direct usage of user provided data in
response page,he/she can enter some malicious script into search box as shown
in figure 1.6.That script will get executed with access privileges of the web
application.As it is considered as part of that response page.
5
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Figure 1.6: Search with malicious input
1.1.2 Persistent/Stored XSS attack
Stored XSS attacks are more dangerous than other types of XSS. Because malicious
scripts injected by attacker are stored permanently by server in databases or
webpages and served back to other users as normal pages coming from trusted
application and user is interpreting them without proper HTML sanitization.
Various sinks like database, message forum, comment fields and visitor logs are
used to store such malicious scripts permanently, and sent to user browser when
request is made for particular content.
Figure 1.7: Stored XSS attack flow
6
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Above figure 1.7 shows general flow of attack.Attacker inserts script in web
page of vulnerable website.Whenever victim accesses that webpage malicious script
injected by attacker is embedded as content of response page and sent to victims
browser and browser will execute it with same access privileges as that of any
other script or HTML content from that web page.
Persistent attacks are considered to easy for execution in perception of attacker
as once he/she succeed in injection of script it will be stored permanently in
that page and wherever user access that page it gets executed and resulting into
attack,but in case of reflected XSS attack attacker need to trick user to click
malicious links either by social engineering or other means.
1.1.3 DOM based XSS attack
DOM XSS is type cross site scripting attack which arise due to improper handling
of data related with DOM (Document Object Model) present in HTML page.
DOM is standard for accessing and manipulating objects in HTML document.
Every HTML entity present in page can be accessed and modified by using
DOM properties such as document.referrer, document.url and document.location.
Attacker can manipulate or access DOM properties to execute such type of attack.
In the DOM-based XSS, the malicious script does not reach to the web
server. It is executed at client side only.DOM based XSS attack occurs when
user provided untrusted data is interpreted as JavaScript using methods such as
eval(), document.write or innerHTML. The main culprit for these type of attacks
is JavaScript code.
1.2 Impact of XSS attack
Impact of XSS attack totally depends on the sensitivity of the data handled by
vulnerable site. It may range from petty low to significantly high. Below list
mention the various impacts of XSS.
7
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1.2.1 Cookie stealing and account hijacking
Important information such as session ID is stored in cookies which can be stolen
by an attacker, so it is possible for an attacker to steal the user’s identity and
confidential information associate with it. In case of normal users, it will lead
loss of personal information such as bank account credentials and credit card
information. For administrator user having high privileges, if there account is
compromised through XSS, attacker can access web server and associated database
system and thus will have complete control on the web application.
1.2.2 Misinformation
One of the severe threats of XSS is a danger of credentialed misinformation. These
types of attacks can include malware that can spy on user’s browsing activities
and therefore get traffic statistics, which leads to loss of privacy. Other type of
misinformation is that malicious code can modify the appearance of the content
of the page, after it is interpreted by the web browser.
1.2.3 Denial of Service
In view of an enterprise, it is critical that their Web applications must be accessible
at all times. However, malicious scripts can cause loss of availability. Loss if
availability can be achieved by redirecting user to different page whenever he tries
to access particular legitimate page which can be achieved through XSS. Past
example of XSS attack was spread of XSS worm in social network site Myspace.com
which resulted in Denial of Service (DOS) attack. Also malicious script can crash
user browser by using script that will throw alert boxes infinitely hence user is not
allowed to access particular page.
1.2.4 Browser exploitation
Malicious script can route client browser to attackers site and then attacker can
take benefit of security vulnerabilities present in web browser to have full control
8
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over user computer by executing various system commands like installing Trojan
horse programs on the client or upload local data containing information about
user credentials.
1.3 Motivation
Keeping the research directions a step forward, it has been realised that there
exists enough scope to new research work. The previous work involving server
side filters are checking for JavaScript and blindly blocking it without checking
that they are harmful or benign scripts.
The idea of the proposed project work leads to development of server side
API that will check for JavaScripts and it’s intent.And filter will allow or block it
depending on it’s malicious or benign intents. This filtering is done on response
generated by server before sending it to client.
1.4 Thesis Layout
Rest of the thesis is organized as follows —
Chapter 2: Literature Survey It provides the analysis of existing client and
server side mitigation mechanism available to detect and prevent XSS attack and
their limitations.
Chapter 3: Design of DOM based XSS filter In this chapter, we will
discuss various factor considered during design of filter.It also vulnerable entities
present in HTML and how to negotiate them in order to prevent XSS attack.
Chapter 4: Implementation and Results This chapter includes the results
obtained from implemented filter and comparison with existing filters with respect
response time and fidelity.
9
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Chapter 5:Conclusion and Future Work This chapter involves analysis of
our work and limitation of current work.It also provides in sites of future work to




In this chapter we discuss existing security measures employed by browser and
already existing techniques to avoid XSS attack.
2.1 Document Object Model
The Document Object Model (DOM) is a programming API for accessing and
modifying XML documents. DOM defines the logical structure of documents and
different ways of access and manipulation of document. In the DOM specification,
the term ”document” is used in the broad sense, XML is being used as a means of
representing different formats of information that can be stored in heterogeneous
systems, and much of this would interpret as data rather than as documents.
However, XML presents this data as documents, and the DOM may be used to
control this data
With the Document Object Model, programmers can create and build
documents, explore its structure, and add new elements, edit or delete existing
elements and content. Any entity present in HTML or XML document can be
accessed, changed, deleted or added using the Document Object Model, without
any restrictions.
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Figure 2.1: Simple HTML code
Figure 2.2: DOM structure of HTML given above
2.2 Same Origin Policy(SOP)
Same origin policy allows running scripts on pages originating from the same
website, i.e. same combination of protocol, domain and port number to access the
DOM of each other, with no specific restrictions, but prevents access to DOM
on different websites. This mechanism has particular importance for modern
web applications that rely heavily on HTTP cookies to maintain sessions of
authenticated users, as servers uses HTTP cookies information to reveal sensitive
information or take action of status change. A strict separation between content
provided by unrelated sites should be maintained at the client side to prevent the
loss of confidentiality or data integrity [21].
12
Chapter 2 Literature Survey
2.2.1 Weakness in Same Origin Policy
Sometimes SOP is considered as too restrictive for large websites having different
sub domains. In order to have communication between different sub domains
present in one parent domain. The ’document.domain’ property is used. It is
possible to have communication between foo.example.com and bar.example.com
by down sampling the domains of both using document.domain method as shown
in below figure [22].
Figure 2.3: Relaxing SOP using document.domain
But this can result in security hole as this two domains can have access to
DOM properties of each other can result in arbitrary mess.
2.3 Content Security Policy
W3C specification provides the ability to guide the client browser from the location
and/or type of resources that are allowed to load. Loading behavior is defined by
CSP specification called directive. It defines loading behavior for a target resource
type. A newly developed web application can use CSP to mitigate XSS attack by
allowing particular scripts for execution at client side that are specified in policy
and blocking inline JavaScripts.
13
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2.3.1 Weakness in Content Security Policy
CSP is just a additional layer of security applied at client side.It is not a
replacement of traditional mechanism of validation and escaping of input and
output on the server-side.It also requires manual changes to be done in each
and every page of website.Applying CSP manually is tedious task for large web
application because the web administrators have to change server-side code to
identify which codes and resources (e.g. JavaScirpts) are used by web pages. And
also these scripts need to be isolated from web page.
2.4 Server side XSS mitigation
There are several solutions implemented at server side for prevention XSS
attacks.They are as follows
2.4.1 AntiSamy
AntiSamy is a project by OWSAP (Open Web Application Security Project) for
prevention of XSS. It is input validation and output encoding tool that provides
a set of APIs that can be invoked to filter and validate the input against XSS and
ensure user input supplied conforms to the rules of an application. The tool uses
NekoHTML and Policy file for validating HTML and CSS inputs. NekoHTML is
a simple HTML parser that is used to parse given HTML to XML document. The
policy file includes entities like common attributes, regular expressions, general
tag, directives, CSS and other rules used for validation. It can be modified as per
requirement of web administrator [1].
Limitation
There are lost issues regarding interpretation of HTML5 and CSS3.There are lots
of attack vectors that can bypass Antisamy [2].
14
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2.4.2 HTML Purifier
HTML Purifier is an HTML filter library standards compliant written in PHP.
HTML Purifier will remove all sure malicious code (XSS attack vectors) with a
complete analysis, comparing with whitelist of permissible entities; in addition to
this it will ensure that given documents are standards compliant, which is achieved
with a comprehensive knowledge W3C specifications [13].
2.4.3 SWAP
SWAP uses the fact that user browser is final receiver of JavaScript and will
interpret them at client machine. Thus by using a web browser, they are able
to differentiate between benign (i.e. scripts initially associated with the web
application) and JavaScript code which is injected. In first stage, it will encode all
JavaScript present in original web application to syntactically invalid identifiers
(script IDs).In second stage, it will load each and every requested page in the Web
browser connected with the reverse proxy, and check for scripts which browser is
executing. It is clear that all other scripts browser trying to execute have not been
encoded in the first encoding stage hence they are not expected in the content, i.e.
injected malicious scripts. In third stage, after verifying that absence of malicious
scripts in the page, it decodes all script IDs encoded in first stage and restore it
to original code, and return the page to the client [33].
Limitations
SWAP introduces a performance overhead as it uses a full-sized Web browser for
JavaScript detection as it offers important assistances of complete vulnerability
detection; same thing can be achieved using more light-weight web filtering tools,
such as Crowbar or HtmlUnit. As SWAP uses Firefox browser for detection of
JavaScript, it will be perfect tool for users using Firefox for browsing. But if
user is using different browser then that Firefox used for detection JavaScript will
not the ideal option as each and every other web browser has different ways of
interpreting the HTML and script contents. Some scripts are considered as benign
15
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for one class of browser but for other it may be malicious.
2.4.4 XSS-GUARD
In XSS-GUARD, the main idea for differentiating between benign and malicious
content is to generate a duplicate response for every (real) HTTP response
produced by the web application. The reason behind the generation of the
duplicate response is to produce the desired set of authorized script sequence
corresponding to the HTTP response. When a HTTP response is generated by web
application, XSS-GUARD will identify the set of scripts present in real response.
The technique used of identification of script requires modified web browser code.
XSS-GUARD then check for presence of script which is not authorized by web
application. This is done by using duplicate response that contains the scripts
which are intended by web application. And presence of intended script is nothing
but XSS attack vector, so XSS-GUARD will remove those scripts and send the
resulting response to the client [25].
Limitations
XSS-GUARD’s current implementation depends on JavaScript detection
component of Firefox browser family so it will fail to identify malicious scripts
based on ’quirks’ targeting other browsers(like IE and Safari). XSS-GUARD will
give different output for attack which are targeted to browsers other than Firefox.
2.4.5 deDacota
deDacota provides novel approach to automatically separate code and data in
a web application using static analysis. Its aim is to transform a given web
application to the new version using statical transformation with preserving the
semantics of the application and produce web pages that will have all its inline
JavaScript code transferred to external JavaScript file. These JavaScript files are
only source of scripts executed by web application adhering to Content Security
16
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Policy (CSP). The remaining JavaScripts are ignored while interpreting the page
[28].
Limitations
deDacota technique mainly focus on separating inline JavaScript code (that is,
JavaScript inside the <script>and </script>). But still there are other ways of
execution of JavaScript attack vectors, like JavaScript code in HTML attributes
(like ’onfocus’ event handler attributes) and inline Cascading Style Sheet (CSS)
styles, the techniques described in this technique can be extended to handle HTML
attributes and inline CSS by rewriting them using approximation.
deDacota’s approach to filter dynamic JavaScript may fail to preserve
application layout as they dynamic content is sanitized as string consisting
multiple JavaScript contexts.
2.5 Client side XSS mitigation
2.5.1 Noxes
Noxes is a Microsoft-Windows-based personal web firewall application that runs
as a daemon service on the user’s system. A personal firewall alerts the user if
a new connection request is detected that does not match the existing firewall
rules. The user can choose to block the connection, allow, or create a permanent
rule that specifies what to do if an application of this type is detected again in
the future. Noxes works as a web proxy that gets HTTP requests on behalf of
the user’s browser. Therefore, all web browser connections go across Noxes and
decision about blocking or allowing particular content depends on current security
policy. [30]
Limitations
Noxes is a client-side web-proxy that conveys all Web traffic and acts as
an application-level firewall. However, in comparison to SWAP, Noxes needs
17
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user-specific settings (firewall configuration), and also it requires user interaction
when any new event occurs that does not matches with the current firewall rules.
Such user awareness is not always guarantied.
2.5.2 XSS Auditor
XSS Auditor achieves high performance and high reliability by bringing the
interface between the browser HTML parser and JavaScript engine. Its
implementation is enabled by default in Google Chrome.XSS Auditors Post-parser
examines the semantics of an HTTP response, as interpreted by the browser,
without the need for an error-prone time consuming simulation. Blocks suspicious
attacks prevent injected script from being passed to the JavaScript engine rather
than risk making changes in the HTML code [24].
Limitation
XSS Auditor considers only reflected XSS vulnerabilities, where the byte sequence
chosen by the attacker appears in the HTTP request and response generated for
that request.It does not mitigate other variants of XSS attack.
2.6 Client and server side mitigation
2.6.1 Document Structure Integrity model
This technique has a new randomized scheme, which is similar to the instruction
set randomization to provide insulation against a robust adaptive attacker. It
preserves the structural integrity of the web application code throughout lifetime
of code even during dynamic updates and operations performed by execution of
client-side code. It ensures that the limitation of untrusted data is consistent with
processing the browser. It removes major difficulties with server-side sanitization
mechanism [32].
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2.6.2 BEEP
BEEP (Browser-Enforced Embedded Policies) intends use of modified web browser
of checking execution attempts of all scripts and also checks with policies provided
by server. Two types of policies are suggested. First policy consists of list of
hashes which are white-listed by web application that is checked by using modified
browser. Second policy deals with highlighting of nodes in HTML source which
are supposed to contain user provided contents, so the browser can determine the
script’s position in DOM tree to check if it is in the user provided content. The
modified browser decides the fate of JavaScript execution by comparing it with
policy file. If current policy allows such JavaScript then it is executed else it is
blocked [29].
Limitations
This method requires modification in server software as well as in the client
browser. That is, it needs to be implemented by users, but most of users are
unaware of damage due to XSS and some of them are unwilling to do additional
effort for security of their systems.
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Designing of DOM based XSS
Filter
In this section we will consider factors considered will differentiating benign HTML
from malicious scripts. Also algorithm implemented by filter and deployment of
filter.
3.1 Threat Model
Before discussing actual design of filter, we discuss regarding the types of attacks
handled and scope of the work, our solution is implemented at server side with little
modification to existing web application. Our proposed solution only designed to
protect from server side XSS attacks i.e. reflected and stored XSS attacks.
Attacker exploits different vulnerabilities present in HTML features such as
tags and attributes. We try to classify attack vector in different classes as follows
[14].
3.1.1 HTML5 vulnerable features
• ”form” and ”formaction” attriibutes
Attributes like ”form” and ”formaction” added to HTML5 for
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”button” tag these attribute can modify destination of user provided
data in the form.This is achieved by using the ”id” associated to
origin form to access that form and then change its ”formaction”
destination [15]. eg: <form id=”test”></form><button form=”test”
formaction=”http://evilsite.com/store.php”>X </button>
Prevention measure for such things is to not allow user inputed contents to
have these attributes. [15]
• ”autofocus” attribute
If we have two input fields with ”autofocus” attribute then the will
competing for the focus which results in Denial of Service.
• Cross Origin HTML imports
Google chrome supports HTML imports that can fetch resources from
external resources.That imports can access and modify DOM content of
original document [6]. eg: <link rel=”import” href=”test.svg”/>
This can be prevented by not allowing imports from external source or they
can be allowed if they are not malicious after checking them.
• <IFRAME >tag’s ”srcdoc” attribute
The attribute value of ”srcdoc” is interpreted as HTML contents




1. Comment Parsing Different browser parse comments differently.It can be a
problem when user submitted input is allowed to contain comments.
eg: <!–<!–<img src=”–><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//”>–>results in
script execution which leads to XSS attack.
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2. CDATA parsing Firefox and Opera allow using CDATA section delimiters
in HTML which can be used as ”<![” and ”<![CDATA[”.This can cause
problems for filtering mechanisms from those delimiters can be used for
large obfuscation.
eg:<svg><![CDATA[><img xlink:href=”]]><img src=xx:x
onerror=alert(2)//”></svg>is example of one of the obfuscated attack
vector.
3.1.3 Event Attributes
Value associated with these attributes is then action taken by system on occurrence
of particular event. This can be used to execute malicious script or access DOM
properties. Hence value associated with such event attribute should be checked
and if they are associated with vulnerable entities then these attributes should be
blocked [9] [20].
Table 3.1: Event attributes in HTML5 used for XSS
HTML entity Event Attributes
Window onafterprint, onbefore, ombeforeunload, onerror,
onhaschange, onmessage, onpageshow, onpagehide,
onrisize, onunload
Form onblur, onchange, oncontextmenu, onfocus, onformchange,
onforminput, oninput, oninvalid, onreset, onselect,
onsubmit
Keyboard onkeydown, onkeypress, onkeyup
Mouse onclick, ondbclick, ondrag, ondrop, onmousedown,
onmousemove, onmouseout, onmouseover, onmouseup
Media onabort, oncanplay, oncanplaythrough, onduratiionchange,
onemptied, onended, onerror, onpause, onpaly, onplayong,
onprogress, onreadystatechange
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3.1.4 Vulnerable DOM properties
DOM properties are used too access various entities of document.The entities
accessed by them can be any tag or attribute from that DOM and it can also
access cookie and history associated with that document that can lead in sensitive
information leak and tracking users surf behavior. So content submitted by user
should not have access to such information i.e. user provided content accessing
DOM properties should be blocked [8].
Table 3.2: DOM properties can be used for XSS attack
DOM property Use in Attack





These properties are used to modify location of document
and can result in Denial of Service
window.history,history.back,
history.forward, history.go
This property can be used to access history of browser tab
and can also navigate through history
document.write, document.writeln,
document.body.innerHTML




This property can be used to set value of tags and attributes
in the page
3.1.5 Links pointing to external contents
1. External flash files
Flash files(.swf) can contain ActionScripts and JavaScripts which can be
vector for XSS. As of now we are planning to block every refernce to external
.swf files.
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2. External script files
Lot of websites includes JavaScript file(.js) from external sources. There
is possibility that these scripts can be malicious or originally benign but
modified by attacker to perform certain attacks. We are extracting contents
of those files and checking for its intent if malicious they are blocked from
inclusion in the page.
3.1.6 Data URI’s
Data URI’s are considered as self-content entities because the generally data
pointed by external source can be stored in Data URI’s saving the fetch time.So
Data URI’s are considered to be hostile as they can be used to execute JavaScript
stored in them.Values stored in data URI’s can also encoded using base64
encoding in order to bypass the filter. In our work,when handing Data URI’s we
are checking for encoding of base64,if present we are decoding it,and checking if
it contains any malicious scripts. [7]
eg:<object data=”data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==”
></object>is sample example of XSS attack vector.
3.1.7 Encoded Attribute Values
There are different encoding techniques used by attacker in order to bypass filters
which works on regular expression.Following are possible encoding mechanism
supported by HTML and JavaScript [23].
URL encoding
It is of the form ”%XX” with or without trailing semicolons.Where ’X’ is any
hexadecimal digit. e.g:”%3C” represents ”<”.
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Decimal HTML character encoding
It is of the form ”&#0*(X)+[;]”.i.e it begins with ”&#” followed by any number
of zeros,after that ’X’ is any decimal number and optional ending semicolon.
e.g:”&#60”,”&#0060”,”&#60;” and ”&#0060;” represents ”<”.
Hexadecimal HTML character encoding
It is of the form ”&#(x/X)0*(D){2}[;]”.i.e it begins with ”&#” followed by ’x’ or
’X’ after that any number of zeros and then two hexadecimal digits and ends with
optional semicolon. e.g:”&#x3c”,”&#x003c”,”&#x00003c;” and ”&#X0003c;”
represents ”<”.
Unicode encoding
It is of the form ”\u00XX” where ’X’ is any hexadecimal digit.It starts with ”\u”
followed by two zeros and then two hexadecimal digits eg:”\u003c” and ”\u003C”
represents ”<”.
Hex encoding
It is of the form ”\xDD” where ’D’ is any hexadecimal digit. e.g:”\x3c” and
”\x3C” represents ”<”.
HTML entity encoding
Various symbols in HTML are encoded using HTML entity encoding such as
”&quot;” represent ’”’,”&amp;” represents ”&”, ”&lt;” represents ”<”,”&gt;”
represents ”>”,”&lpar;” represents ”(” and ”&rpar;” represents ”)”.
3.1.8 Cascaded Style Sheet vectors
Internet Explorer supports data for displaying images and supplying stylesheet
information. This can be used to include expression() CSS into a data URI
and execute JavaScript with a <STYLE>@import directive. eg:<style>@import
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”data:,*%7bx:expression(write(1))%7D”;</style>
CSS properties like ”-o-link” and ”-o-link-source” allow JavaScript as its value
and can exploited by attacker. Opera supports the CSS property ”content” for
style attributes those points to external URL of .svg file which may contain the
dynamic HTML content.
3.1.9 History Tampering
The history.replaceState() and history.pushState() API allows to create and
change the user’s history. An attacker can use this feature to change the
information displayed in the address bar as well as the location DOM object
and thus results in phishing attacks or obfuscate bad intentions. pushState is
used to add a new history entry and replaceState used to modify the current
entry.This uproots about all hints of the real area from the searching history
giving no probability to explore back. The information indicated in the address
bar can’t be trusted any longer when an malicious site execute Javascript.
e.g:<script>history.pushState(0,0,’/imp/bin/i-am-hacked’);</script>
3.1.10 Vectors embedded in SVG files and <SVG>tag
SVG files can contain dynamic HTML contents that can execute JavaScript via
’onload’ events on any element without user interaction. So SVG files should not
be considered as simple image files and need to be handled carefully. e.g:<svg
xmlns=”http://www.w3.org/2000/svg”><script>alert(1)</script></svg>
SVG tag allows ’onload’ attribute which can be used to execute code
without support of any other element. e.g:<svg onload=”javascript:alert(1)”
xmlns=”http://www.w3.org/2000/svg”></svg>
3.1.11 HTML tag and attributes
Some HTML tag and attributes points to link which may be external to website.
But attacker can uses these links to point to malicious contents. So in order to
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avoid this we should enlist the tag and attributes with their allowed file types.Table
3.3 provides the list of allowed file types for particular tag and attributes [11] [12].
Table 3.3: HTML tags and attributes and their allowed file types












3.1.12 Special tags and attributes
HTML tag <base>with ”href” attribute can change the base address of web
application. Hence it can affect all relative paths referenced in page. Hence we
should not allow attacker from changing that value. Also <script>tag can inject
arbitrary script in web page which is executed with all permissions and prohibit
user from injecting malicious scripts.
3.2 Problem Statement
Any proposed solution should not burden the client with extra efforts such
as installing tools and creating rules or taking decision such as whether to
block or allow particular new address link.Because the user awareness cannot be
27
Chapter 3 Designing of DOM based XSS Filter
guaranteed. Also proposed XSS attack prevention technique should not requires
large modification in existing system. The main challenge in designing solution
is that it should block every attempt of malicious script injection including novel
attack vectors. Because various encoding techniques can be used to bypass the
filter mechanism used. Another challenge during filter design is should not totally
depend on the regular expressions for detection of the attack because such filters
can easily bypassed using various quirks.
As every web administrator focus on reducing response time of its website, the
proposed solution should not largely increase in existing response time. So, there
is trade off between response time and security achieved.
3.3 Proposed Solution
Some of the existing solutions are implementing input filtration mechanism
[26].But escaping the user provided data on input is bad idea as we don’t know
how that data is utilized by application [16]. So in our proposed solution we are
filtering the server response for client request which contains user inserted data
that will be rendered by client browser. So server response filtering will give us
insight into possibility of presence of malicious script and hence we can filter it
out properly [23].
The proposed modified web application will separate the user provided contents
present in response from the original content of web application by inserting
boundary tag. So we will first extract user inserted data from the response and
will check for malicious scripts and then filter them if there is any. After filtering
user data it is again embedded in user response.
Our proposed solution uses DOM based filtering mechanism for detection and
removal of malicious scripts. This filtering mechanism uses HTML parser to
parse user provided data in DOM tree. And then that DOM tree is traversed
as mentioned in Algorithm 1 given below. After filtering malicious script out from
the response the result is sent to client browser. Filter works with white-list based
filtering mechanism.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm implemented for filteration of server response
1: The content is preprocessed to remove various types of encodings discussed in
section 3.1.7.
2: The processed content is parsed using Jsoup HTML parser [18] to DOM.
3: Then resulting DOM is searched for presence of event attributes as discussed
in section 3.1.3.If these attributes are accessing any DOM properties enlisted
in section 3.1.4. Then these event attributes are filtered out from content.
4: Then filtered DOM is searched for presence of attributes like ’formaction’
discussed in section 3.1.1 and these attributes are filtered out from DOM.
5: Then DOM is searched for attributes enlisted in section 3.1.11 and checked for
their values against allowable list. If attribute value does not matches with
white-list then they are removed else they are retained in output DOM
6: Then filtered DOM is checked for embedded CSS in <style>tag and style
attribute. If these CSS content contains any malicious scripts then these CSS
contents are dropped else retained in DOM.
7: Then DOM is checked for <svg>tag and if it points to any dynamic HTML
content then that attribute of <svg>tag is blocked.
8: Then filtered DOM is checked for presence of combination of tag-attribute
pair discussed in section 3.1.11 and checked for value of attribute checked
with allowable extension. If value file extension is allowed file list then that
attribute is allowed else filtered out.
9: Then resulted DOM is searched for Data URIs .The values associated with
them is decoded using proper decoding scheme and checked for malicious
content if present that Data URI is removed else retained.







There are number of HTML parsers implemented in Java, we compared them on
the basis of their HTML parsing capabilities, handing of malformed HTML to
produce clean HTML and support to updated HTML5 features [5].
Table 4.1: Comparison of various HTML parsers
Parser HTML Parsing Clean HTML Update HTML
Jaunt API Yes Yes No
JTidy Yes No No
Validator.nu HTML Parser Yes No No
Jsoup Yes Yes Yes
We have selected Jsoup HTML parser [18] in our proposed work as it is
considered as robust among existing parsers.
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4.1.2 Parser modification
We have modified comment handling mechanism of Jsoup parser, originally Jsoup
parser was keeping comments are parsing the content. As there are lot of attack
vectors which are based on comment based parsing quirks ,we modified Jsoup, so
that it will remove all the comments present in content after it. This will provide
mitigation against whole family of comment based parsing quirks.
4.1.3 Filter deployment
We have filtered server response using Java Filter Interface [17].For implementing
filter we have created class named ContentFilter.java which will implement
Java Interface ’Filter’.In doFilter() method of this class we will chain the
response to another class named ’DummyResponse.java’ which extending
’HttpServletResponseWrapper’. In this calls we are extracting user provided
contents from the response and calling our filtering API. The filtered output from
API is embedded in response and it is sent to client.
In order to implicitly call the filter for every page we need to change in the
’web.xml’ file as shown below.
Figure 4.1: Changes in web.xml needed for implicit filtering
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4.1.4 Results
Fidelity Results
We have tested our filter on around 230 attack vectors from XSS Cheat Sheet
[20],HTML5 security cheat sheet [15] and other sources [19].Out of 230 attack
vector some off them are not effective due changes in modern browsers.
For testing we have created on XSS vulnerable web application using JSP and
deployed on Apache Tomcat 7.0 web server [3].We have tested on 5 majorly used
web browsers. Following table shows the analysis of attack vectors.











Chrome 34.0.1847.131 106 106 0
Opera 20.0.1387.91 115 115 0
Firefox 29.0.0 108 108 0
IE 8.0.7600.16385 119 119 0
Safari 5.1.7 104 104 0
Response Time Analysis
For response time analysis we used Firefox browser and Apache Tomcat 7.0 as
web server [3] both residing on same machine. We used Firebug extension [10] in
Firefox for calculation of response time. For each page of mentioned size we have
done 20 reloads and average time is used for analysis.
We have also compared response time results with SWAP [33] and comparison
results are shown in graph shown in figure 4.2.
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2 8.6923 33.2307 24.5384 2.823
10 14.461538 55.08255 40.6210 2.8089
50 39.9580 151.7272 111.7692 2.7961
100 85.0019 306.6676 221.6657 2.6077
200 137.1838 501.1111 363.9273 2.6528
Figure 4.2: Response Time Comparison
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Conclusions and Future Work
Our proposed filtering API will filter the server response rather that user input
which will ensure the more insight in attack mitigation. The proposed mechanism
employs the API for detection of malicious scripts rather than using modified web
browser [33] which will result in low overhead as discussed in result section, and
also it will block attack vectors targeted to almost all popularly used web browser
rather than for one which was used for malicious script detection [27].
Proposed method requires less modification at server application as compared
to other solutions [29] [25]which will not burden web developer. It does not require
any modification at client side hence user awareness not needed in deployment and
usage of the mechanism. It also provides loss of functionality by allowing benign
HTML content to pass through it.
As it is implemented as server side it will only detect and block server side XSS
attacks. It will not mitigate DOM based XSS attacks [31]. Our filtering mechanism
uses white-list based approach and we tried to cover all known XSS vulnerabilities
present in HTML5 and JavaScript still date, but our filtering mechanism may be
bypassed by using zero-day XSS attack vector.
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Scope for Further Research
Our proposed work does not provide mitigation against DOM based(Client side)
XSS attack [31]. In future this type of attack mitigation can be achieved by
applying filtering at client side with modification in browser. And also various
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